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321 
FOUR WALLS DO NOT AN EATING FACILITY 
MAKE: ARGUING AGAINST THE U.S. TAX 
COURT’S UNPRECEDENTED JACOBS V. 
COMMISSIONER DECISION 
Brendan Zwaneveld 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
June 26, 2017 is a day that Boston Bruins owner Jeremy Jacobs 
will likely never forget. After owning Boston’s professional hockey 
franchise since 1975, the Hockey Hall of Fame announced that Jacobs 
was to be inducted into their Class of 2017.1 While induction into the 
Hockey Hall of Fame is a significant achievement, on that same day 
Jacobs and his team won an important legal victory away from the 
ice.2 
On June 26, 2017, the Bruins scored a victory against the Internal 
Revenue Service when the United States Tax Court held that Jacobs’s 
team, the Boston Bruins, was entitled to deduct all of the expenses for 
feeding players and other employees while traveling for away games.3 
It is commonplace for businesses to deduct some of the costs of 
feeding their employees on the job, but the Bruins’s deduction 
stemmed from unique circumstances.4 The Bruins were allowed a 
deduction under section 132(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code for 
meals provided in conference rooms at away game hotels because they 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, 
University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor Ellen Aprill for her guidance 
and thoughtful feedback throughout the writing process. Thank you to the editors and staff of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review their hard work to help bring this Comment to publication, 
especially Richard Gano for bringing this case to my attention. Finally, thank you to my family for 
their unconditional love and support.  
 1. Boston Bruins, Bruins Owner Jeremy Jacobs to be Inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame, 
NHL.COM (June 26, 2017), https://www.nhl.com/bruins/news/bruins-owner-jeremy-jacobs-to-be-
inducted-into-the-hockey-hall-of-fame/c-290162742. 
 2. Peter J. Reilly, Billionaire Bruins Owner Beats IRS on Tax Deductions for Away Game 
Meals, FORBES (June 27, 2017, 8:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2017/06/27/ 
jeremy-jacobs-beats-irs-in-tax-court-on-bruins-meal-deductions/#4554629265a1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See I.R.C. §§ 132(e) (2011), 162(a)(2) (2012), 274(n)(2)(A-B) (2017). 
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successfully argued the hotels constituted the team’s “business 
premises” and that the conference rooms were “eating facilities.”5 The 
U.S. Tax Court sided with the Bruins and granted the full deduction.6 
This decision not only saved the team money on its taxes, but also 
opened the section 132(e)(2) deduction to a wide group of taxpayers.7 
In fact, major accounting firms like PricewaterhouseCoopers already 
foresee how this ruling may allow their corporate clients to secure 
100% deductions for meals provided to employees traveling for 
business purposes.8 After Jacobs, gone is the notion that an “eating 
facility” is limited to a company cafeteria or office dining room.9 And 
now a company’s “business premises” can be lifted and transplanted 
every couple of days to a new city far from its main facilities. 
This Comment argues that the U.S. Tax Court’s holding in Jacobs 
v. Commissioner10 excessively expanded the scope of the de minimis 
fringe deduction under Internal Revenue Code section 132(e)(2) 
beyond prior authorities, setting a new company-friendly standard for 
employer-provided meal deductions that has implications beyond 
professional hockey. Part II explains the legal background for the 
Bruins’s deduction in Jacobs. Part III sets out the facts of Jacobs v. 
Commissioner and the U.S. Tax Court’s reasoning in deciding the 
case. Part IV argues that the U.S. Tax Court erred in its ruling by 
incorrectly concluding the Bruins’s travel meals were taken on their 
“business premises,” by relying on a non-precedential Tax Court 
Memorandum as authority, and by going against Congress’s intended 
definition of an “eating facility.” Part V concludes by considering 
Jacobs’s ramifications on all taxpayers. 
 
 
 5. Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioners at 16, 22, Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 
2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15) (T.C. 2017). 
 6. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *10 
(T.C. 2017). 
 7. Reilly, supra note 2. 
 8. Rick Farley, Tax Court Allows Full Deduction for Certain Meals Provided to Employees 
on Business Travel, INSIGHTS FROM PEOPLE AND ORG. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.pwc.com/ 
us/en/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-court-gives-full-deduction-for-certain-travel-
meals-for-employees.pdf. 
 9. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *31 
(T.C. 2017). 
 10. 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15) (T.C. 2017). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Internal Revenue Service has long recognized the ability of 
businesses to deduct “ordinary and necessary” business expenses.11 In 
the area of employer-operated eating facilities, the Tax Code 
“prescribes a complex and not-always-intuitive formula” for 
determining deductibility.12 The employer-operated eating facility 
deduction itself is contained within section 132(e)(2), but to arrive at 
that section, a taxpayer has to first show that the meals qualify for a 
deduction under section 162.13 Section 162 business meals are then 
limited to a 50% deduction by section 274(n).14 Finally, section 
132(e)(2) is invoked as an exception to section 274(n)’s 50% 
limitation on deductibility.15 Then, section 119 can be implicated as a 
safe-harbor for section 132(e)(2)’s revenue/operating costs 
requirement.16 
A.  Section 162 
Under section 162(a), taxpayers are allowed a deduction for 
“ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on 
any trade or business.”17 This section is expansive, containing specific 
guidance regarding the deductibility of everything from employee 
salaries to illegal bribes and kickbacks.18 Regardless, as long as a 
business expense is “ordinary and necessary,” that expense is 
deductible. What constitutes an “ordinary and necessary” expense, 
however, is very fact specific.19 
Of importance here, section 162(a)(2) includes “traveling 
expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other 
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the 
circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or 
 
 11. I.R.C. § 162 (2012). 
 12. Syd Gernstein, Boston Bruins Raise Controversy by Arguing that Meals are Deductible, 
Team is “World Class,” BLOOMBERG TAX: FED. TAX BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.bna.com 
/boston-bruins-raise-b17179934636/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012). 
 18. Id. §§ 162(a)(1) and (c). 
 19. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (“One struggles in vain for any verbal 
formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; 
it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle.”). 
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business” as deductible.20 However, the analysis does not stop here. 
Section 274 disallows or places limitations on some deductions 
“otherwise allowable” under section 162.21 
B.  Section 274 
Section 274 is a wide-ranging provision of the Tax Code that 
places restrictions on many types of otherwise deductible expenses.22 
Section 274(e) then provides a number of specific exceptions to 
expenses restricted under section 274(a), including “[e]xpenses for 
food and beverages (and facilities used in connection therewith) 
furnished on the business premises of the taxpayer primarily for his 
employees.”23 While certain employer provided meals are specifically 
allowed by section 274(e)(1), section 274(n) places a 50% limitation 
on all otherwise deductible business meals paid for by an employer.24 
Business meals fall into a gray area between business and 
personal expenses.25 On one hand, meals consumed on the job can be 
necessary for conducting business, but on the other hand people need 
to eat regardless of whether or not they are working.26 To account for 
the inherently personal portion of business meals, Congress 
implemented a 50% limitation on otherwise deductible costs as a 
compromise between the joint business and personal nature of 
business meals.27 However, this 50% limitation contained in section 
274(n) is subject to certain exceptions.28 
Section 274(n) limits allowable deductions to 50% for “food or 
beverages” unless “such expense is excludable from the gross income 
of the recipient under section 132 by reason of subsection (e) thereof 
 
 20. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2012). 
 21. I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) (2017). 
 22. Id. §§ 274(a)(1) (restriction of “entertainment, amusement, or recreation” expenses not 
related to business), (a)(3) (restriction of membership fees for “any club organized for business, 
pleasure, recreation, or other social purpose”), (b)(1) (restriction of gifts greater than $25.00). 
 23. Id. § 274(e)(1). 
 24. Id. § 274(n). 
 25. Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 343, 367 (1989). 
 26. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, 
AND GIFTS ¶ 21.2.2.9 (3d ed. 1999). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Marianna Dyson & Michael Chittenden, Tax Court Expands Section 119 Exclusion in 
Boston Bruins Decision, Tax Withholding & Reporting Blog (June 27, 2017), https://twrblog.com/ 
tag/jacobs-v-commissioner/. 
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(relating to de minimis fringes).”29 Therefore, if the meal qualifies as 
a de minimis fringe benefit under section 132(e), it is not subject to 
the 50% limitation.30 
C.  Section 132 
Prior to 1984, “income tax treatment of nonstatutory fringe 
benefits was a patchwork of Service rulings, surprisingly few 
regulations, and a sprinkling of cases.”31 In an attempt to fix this lack 
of guidance, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
which created a new section 132 that “supplied a comprehensive list 
of specific fringe benefits excluded from income and general authority 
for excluding de minimis fringe benefits.”32 
The general definition of a de minimis fringe benefit is “any 
property or service the value of which is . . . so small as to make 
accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”33 
Typical de minimis fringe benefits include “occasional cocktail 
parties, group meals, or picnics for employees and their guests; 
traditional birthday or holiday gifts of property (not cash) with a low 
fair market value. . . .”34 In addition, section 132(e)(2) explicitly states 
that “[t]he operation by an employer of any eating facility for 
employees shall be treated as a de minimis fringe.”35 
Section 132 requires that the eating facility be “located on or near 
the business premises of the employer.”36 Second, the “revenue 
derived from such facility” must “equal[] or exceed[] the direct 
operating costs of such facility” (“revenue/operating costs test”).37 
Furthermore, access to the facility must be “available on substantially 
the same terms to each member of a group of employees” and cannot 
“discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.”38 
Although section 132 clearly sets out these requirements, the 
corresponding Treasury Regulations outline a four-part test for 
 
 29. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2017). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty Years, 25 
VA. TAX REV. 977, 982 (2006). 
 32. Id. at 979. 
 33. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2011). 
 34. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e) (2014). 
 35. I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (2011). 
 36. Id. § 132(e)(2)(A) (2011). 
 37. Id. § 132(e)(2)(B) (2011). 
 38. Id. § 132(e)(2) (2011). 
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determining if an employer-operated eating facility qualifies for the de 
minimis fringe deduction: (i) The facility is owned or leased by the 
employer; (ii) The facility is operated by the employer; (iii) The 
facility is located on or near the business premises of the employer; 
and (iv) The meals furnished at the facility are provided during, or 
immediately before or after, the employee’s workday.39 
Therefore, the employer-operated eating facility de minimis 
fringe test is essentially a five-pronged test: the four requirements 
from the section 132 regulation explained above, plus the section 
132(e)(2)(B) requirement that the revenue derived from the facility 
equals or exceeds the facility’s operating costs. 
However, Treasury Regulation § 1.132-7(a)(ii)(2) provides a 
safe-harbor from the section 132(e)(2)(B) revenue/operating costs 
requirement: the revenue/operating costs requirement of section 
132(e)(2) will be deemed satisfied if an employee eating at the facility 
can exclude the value of the meal provided from his or her own gross 
income under section 119.40 Accordingly, a taxpayer can either prove 
that the meal was excludable from its employee’s gross income under 
section 119, or it can satisfy the revenue/operating costs requirement 
to qualify for a deduction under section 132(e)(2). 
D.  Section 119 
Section 119 allows an employee to exclude the value of any 
“[m]eals and lodging furnished to employee” from his or her gross 
income as long as it was provided “for the convenience of the 
employer” and “the meals [were] furnished on the business premises 
of the employer.”41 Meals are furnished for the convenience of the 
employer if, “upon an examination of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances, . . . such meals are furnished for a substantial 
noncompensatory business reason.”42 The scope of what constitutes 
an employer’s business premises, however, is very fact dependent.43 
As will be discussed in subsequent sections, there is a significant 
amount of case law interpreting the extent of an employer’s business 
premises. 
 
 39. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(2)(i)–(iv) (2016). 
 40. Id. § 1.132-7(a)(1)(ii) (2016). 
 41. I.R.C. § 119(a)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 42. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (2018). 
 43. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(1) (2018). 
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III.  JACOBS V. COMMISSIONER: FACTS AND REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  The Parties and Issue Before the Court 
Jeremy and Margaret Jacobs (“Petitioners” or “Bruins”) are the 
owners of the Boston Bruins, a professional hockey team playing in 
the National Hockey League.44 Petitioners brought suit against the 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (“Respondent”) to 
fight the $45,205 and $39,823 deficiencies in their 2009 and 2010 
federal income tax payments.45 
The IRS claimed these deficiencies were a result of the Bruins’s 
failure to apply the 50% limitation on the deduction of meal expenses 
under section 274(n).46 The Bruins, however, argued that they were 
entitled to deduct 100% of the away game meal costs because the 
meals qualified as a de minimis fringe expense as defined in section 
132(e)(2).47 Because section 274(n)(2)(B) exempts de minimis fringe 
expenses under section 132(e) from the 50% haircut, the Bruins 
claimed that 100% of their away game meal expenses were 
deductible.48 Therefore, the court had to decide whether the Bruins 
were entitled to deduct the full cost of the pregame meals or whether 
the deduction was limited to 50% by section 272(n)(1).49 
B.  Key Facts of the Case 
Due to the unique facts of Jacobs, the court devoted a sizable 
portion of its decision to explaining the NHL’s travel and scheduling 
policies, the Bruins’s internal travel procedures, and the Bruins’s 
game day schedule for away games.50 
1.  NHL Scheduling and Travel Policies 
The NHL season begins with preseason games in September and 
usually concludes the following June with the Stanley Cup playoffs.51 
During the regular season, every team plays eighty-two games: forty-
 
 44. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *1 (T.C. 
2017). 
 45. Id. at *1. 
 46. Id. at *4–5. 
 47. Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioners at 16, 22, Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 
2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15) (T.C. 2017). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *5. 
 50. Id. at *2–4. 
 51. Id. at *2. 
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one at their home arena and forty-one at arenas in other cities.52 At the 
conclusion of the regular season, eight teams from each of the two 
conferences qualify for the postseason.53 There are then four rounds 
of best-of-seven series, meaning that a team that played every possible 
playoff game could play in 28 additional games.54 
For away games, the NHL requires visiting teams to arrive six 
hours prior to the start of the game.55 Furthermore, the collective 
bargaining agreement between the NHL and the NHL Players’ 
Association requires that teams travel to an away city the day before a 
game if the flight is longer than 150 minutes.56 Accordingly, it is 
necessary for teams to stay in hotels for certain away games. 
2.  The Bruins’s Travel Arrangements 
For each away game, the Bruins bring a large group of employees, 
including “between 20 and 24 players, the head coach, assistant 
coaches, medical personnel, athletic trainers, equipment managers, 
communications personnel, travel logistics managers, public 
relations/media personnel, and other employees” (“traveling hockey 
employees”).57 This same group typically travels to every away game 
during a season.58 
Once the NHL releases the Bruins’s schedule, the team contracts 
with hotels in each away city for sleeping accommodations and 
banquet facilities to host team meals and snacks.59 Obviously 
comfortable sleeping arrangements are important for the Bruins, but 
the team also ensures that the hotel is capable of providing specific 
types and quantities of food to fuel the team to “avoid players’ having 
gastric problems during the game.”60 After contacting the hotel, the 
hotel sends the Bruins a banquet event order (“BEO”) which outlines 
the “date, time, meal room, number of guests, menu, and pricing for 
each pregame meal” to guarantee the accommodations will be correct 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Playoff Formats, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=25433 (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2018). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at *3. 
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when the team arrives.61 
3.  The Bruins’s Game Day Schedule 
When the Bruins are scheduled to play an evening game, the 
players have mandatory breakfast between 8:00 and 10:00 AM in the 
room designated in the BEO.62 During breakfast, in addition to eating, 
players often conduct team business like meeting with coaches to 
discuss game strategy or talking with the Bruins’s public relations 
team regarding media inquiries.63 Following breakfast, the Bruins 
usually hold a pregame practice session at the arena before returning 
to the hotel for lunch.64 
Lunch is structured similarly to breakfast, with the coaches often 
pulling groups of players aside as they eat to watch game film or 
review the upcoming game plan.65 After lunch, the players are 
afforded free time until the team leaves for the arena that evening.66 
During their free time at the hotel, players can meet with the Bruins’s 
athletic training staff to receive medical treatment, physical therapy, 
or strength and conditioning training.67 Then, two hours and 
twenty-five minutes before the game, all traveling hockey employees 
board a bus to travel to the arena for the game.68 
Although the NHL typically schedules games during the evening, 
games are occasionally played earlier in the day.69 If the Bruins have 
an afternoon game, their game day schedule is similar, but the team 
holds a mandatory brunch instead of both a breakfast and lunch.70 
C.  Holding and Reasoning of the Court 
To determine whether section 274(n)(1) limited the Bruins’s 
deduction to 50%, the court had to resolve whether the Bruins’s 
pregame meals met all the requirements to qualify as an employer-
operated eating facility under section 132(e)(2). 
 
 61. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *3 (T.C. 
2017). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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As explained above, before the Bruins could qualify for the de 
minimis fringe exception under section 132(e)(2), the team first had to 
show that their pregame meals qualified as ordinary and necessary 
under section 162. However, in Jacobs, the IRS did concede that “the 
Bruins’[s] pregame meal expenses are associated with the active 
conduct of petitioner’s trade or business,” so the court did not rule on 
this issue.71 Therefore, the court went straight to applying the section 
132(e)(2) test to the case. 
For simplicity, the court applied a five-part version of the section 
132(e)(2) test as distilled from the case Boyd Gaming Corp. v. 
Commissioner.72 As explained in Part II of this Comment and in Boyd, 
to qualify as an employer-operated eating facility under section 
132(e)(2) and its corresponding regulations, the facility must meet the 
following requirements: (1) it must be owned or leased by the 
employer; (2) it must be operated by the employer; (3) it must be 
located on or near the business premises of the employer; (4) the meals 
furnished at the facility must be provided during, or immediately 
before or after, the employee’s workday; and (5) the annual revenue 
derived from the “facility [must] normally equal[] or exceed[]” the 
direct operating costs of the facility.73 
Before applying the five-part test, the court analyzed whether the 
Bruins’s eating facility was “available on substantially the same 
terms” to all of the team’s traveling hockey employees.74 The court 
found that the Bruins “provided credible testimony that the pregame 
meals were made available to all Bruins’[s] traveling hockey 
employees—highly compensated, nonhighly compensated, players, 
and nonplayers—on substantially the same terms.”75 Therefore, the 
court held that the Bruins satisfied the “nondiscriminatory manner 
requirement of section 132(e)(2).”76 
 
 
 71. Id. at *5. 
 72. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *6 (T.C. 
2017) (citing Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. 343 (1996)). 
 73. Boyd, 106 T.C. at 348 (1996) (citing I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (2011) and Treas. Reg. § 1.132-
7(a) (2016)). 
 74. I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (2011). 
 75. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *10. 
 76. Id. at *6. 
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1.  Did the Bruins Own or Lease Their Eating Facilities? 
Following the five-part test, the Jacobs court first analyzed if the 
Bruins “owned or leased” the hotel conference rooms in which the 
team provided pregame meals. The court correctly pointed out that the 
Treasury Regulations do not define the word “lease” in the context of 
employer-operated eating facilities.77 Therefore, the court applied a 
fundamental cannon of statutory interpretation to define “lease”: 
“unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”78 To find the common 
meaning of “lease,” the court used the definition from Black’s Law 
Dictionary: “[a] contract by which a rightful possessor of real property 
conveys the right to use and occupy the property in exchange for 
consideration.”79 
The banquet event orders and other contracts between the Bruins 
and their away hotels were never explicitly identified as leases, but the 
Jacobs court found that “the Bruins are paying consideration in 
exchange for ‘the right to use and occupy’ the hotel meal rooms.”80 
Accordingly, the court found “these agreements [were] substantively 
leases,” and therefore satisfied the first prong of the section 132(e)(2) 
test.81 
2.  Were the Eating Facilities Operated by the Bruins? 
Unlike “lease,” the Treasury Regulations do provide a definition 
of “operated” in the context of section 132(e)(2): “If an employer 
contracts with another to operate an eating facility for its employees, 
the facility is considered to be operated by the employer for purposes 
of [section 132(e)(2)].”82 The Bruins contract with each hotel to ensure 
that meal preparation and service meet the team’s requirements.83 The 
hotel then provides the food service staff for the Bruins’s meal room 
and charge a service fee as part of the banquet event orders.84 Because 
the Bruins set requirements for their meals and the hotel charged a 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 79. Id. (citing Lease, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *6 (T.C. 
2017). 
 82. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(3) (2016). 
 83. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *7. 
 84. Id. 
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service fee in return, the court reasoned that the banquet event orders 
constituted “contract[ing] with another to operate an eating facility for 
its employees.”85 
3.  Were the Away Hotel Eating Facilities on  
the Bruins’s Business Premises? 
The majority of the cases interpreting the definition of an 
employer’s “business premises” have done so in the context of a 
section 119 analysis; not section 132.86 However, as the Jacobs court 
explained, because Congress did not give any direction to the contrary, 
case law dictates that the court should connote the same meaning to 
the phrase “business premises” in both section 119 and section 132.87 
Therefore, the Jacobs court drew on section 119 “business premises” 
cases to make its determination. 
Citing Benninghoff v. Commissioner, the Jacobs court explained 
that an “employer’s business premises is a place where employees 
perform a significant portion of duties or where the employer conducts 
a significant portion of business.”88 The court continued on, stating: 
“An inquiry regarding business premises infers a functional rather 
than spatial unity and is not limited by questions of geography or 
quantum of business activities.”89 
To illustrate the principle that a company’s business premises are 
based on where the work is done, not based on where the company is 
located, the court compared the  facts before it to those of Mabley v. 
Commissioner.90 In Mabley, the U.S. Tax Court was faced with the 
issue of whether the Island Creek Coal Company’s leased hotel space 
for lunch meetings qualified as the company’s business premises 
under section 119.91 The Mabley court concluded “that the rented hotel 
suite in which the meals were furnished was acquired and actually 
used for the conduct of business of the company, the furnishing of the 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Lindeman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 60 T.C. 609, 614 (1973), Benninghoff v. 
Comm’r, 71 T.C. 216, 218 (1978), Adams v. United States, 585 F.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Ct. Cl. 1978), 
Vanicek v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 731, 739 (1985). 
 87. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *7 n. 12 (citing W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 
338, 359 (1994), aff’d, 65 F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 88. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *7 n. 12 (citing Benninghoff, 71 T.C. at 220). 
 89. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *7 n. 12 (citing Adams, 585 F.2d at 1066) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 90. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *8. 
 91. Mabley v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. 1794 (1965). 
(12)51.1_ZWANEVALDDO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
2018] CHALLENGING JACOBS 333 
meals being merely incidental.”92 Therefore, the hotel suite qualified 
as the company’s business premises under section 119.93 
Turning to the facts at hand, the Jacobs court explained that 
because of the NHL’s scheduling requirements, the Bruins’s traveling 
employees “perform[ed] . . . significant business duties at away city 
hotels.”94 The court explained that because the NHL mandates that 
teams play games in away cities, “an integral part of the Bruins’[s] 
professional hockey business involves traveling throughout the United 
States and Canada.”95 Therefore, the court believed, the Bruins have 
to conduct important business activities in away city hotels to ensure 
their success.96 
Moreover, similar to how the company in Mabley used company 
lunches to review business issues, the Jacobs court reasoned that the 
Bruins’s meals “serve[d] as a forum for the Bruins to maximize 
preparation time and conduct team business” while nutritionally 
fueling the team.97 Furthermore, sometimes the Bruins’s “trainers 
use[d] hotel space to provide players with medical treatment, physical 
therapy, and massages.”98 Accordingly, because of the similarities to 
Mabley and the variety of preparatory activities conducted at the 
hotels, the Jacobs court held that the hotels constituted the Bruins’s 
business premises.99 
4.  Did the Bruins Satisfy the Revenue/Operating Cost Test? 
As explained in Part II, a taxpayer can satisfy the 
revenue/operating costs test under section 132(e)(2)(B) if the 
employee receiving the meal can exclude its value from his or her 
gross income under section 119.100 Accordingly, the Jacobs court 
needed to determine if the Bruins’s away pregame meals were “(1) 
furnished for the convenience of the employer and (2) furnished on the 
business premises of the employer.”101 The court had already 
completed its analysis of the Bruins’s business premises, so it only had 
 
 92. Id. at 1797. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *8. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
      98.   Id. at *9. 
 99. Id. at *9–10. 
 100. Id. at *9. 
 101. I.R.C. § 119(a)(1) (2000). 
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to determine whether the meals were provided for the Bruins’s 
convenience.102 
Applying Treasury Regulation § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i), the Jacobs 
court analyzed whether the Bruins provided away meals for a 
“substantial noncompensatory business reason.”103 The evidence 
established that the Bruins fed their traveling hockey employees 
primarily for nutritional performance reasons, but also to maximize 
preparation time in an otherwise hectic schedule.104 The court 
explained that it should “not second-guess [the Bruins’s] business 
judgment,” and that therefore the evidence provided showed a 
substantial business reason for the meals.105 Thus, the Bruins satisfied 
the revenue/operating costs test. 
5.  Were the Meals Furnished Before, During, or After the 
Employee’s Workday? 
The IRS conceded that the Bruins provided their traveling hockey 
employees with meals during their workday.106 Consequently, the 
court did not conduct an in-depth analysis of this prong.107 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Jacobs, the U.S. Tax Court creatively applied various 
authorities in order to come to a very taxpayer-favorable decision. 
Although the court properly decided many aspects of the case, the 
court should not have found that the section 132(e)(2) test was 
satisfied because the Bruins did not consume the meals on their 
“business premises.” Therefore, the employer-operated eating facility 
deduction should have been denied. 
A.  The Bruins’s Meals Were Not Provided on Their Business 
Premises 
As mentioned above, a key requirement for the employer-
operated eating facility deduction is that the meals are provided on the 
“business premises of the employer.”108 While the phrase “business 
 
 102. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *9–10. 
 103. Id. at *10. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.132-7(a)(2)(iii) (2016), 119(a)(1) (2018). 
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premises of the employer” appears in sections 274(e)(1), 132(e)(2), 
and 119(a)(1), most analysis of the meaning of the phrase has been in 
the context of section 119.109 Under traditional statutory interpretation 
rules, “a court should assume that Congress uses language in a 
consistent manner, unless otherwise indicated.”110 Accordingly, a 
court conducting a section 132(e)(2) analysis can look to how other 
courts have interpreted business premises in both section 119 and 274 
cases. 
As mentioned above, the Jacobs court relied on Mabley as the 
leading authority interpreting the extent of an employer’s business 
premises. In this memorandum decision, the Tax Court rejected an IRS 
challenge as to whether the Island Creek Coal Company’s daily lunch 
meetings at a hotel a half-block from its office satisfied the business 
premises requirement of section 119.111 These daily meetings 
“frequently lasted longer than three hours” and each department 
reported on matters of interest to the company.112 The court reasoned 
that as a result of the amount of business discussed during lunch, “the 
rented hotel suite in which the meals were furnished was acquired and 
actually used for the conduct of business of the company, the 
furnishing of the meals being merely incidental.”113 
Relying on this Tax Court Memorandum decision, the Jacobs 
court likened the Bruins’s rental of hotel space for pre-game meals to 
the lease of a hotel suite for daily business meetings in Mabley.114 
However, the facts in Jacobs are easily distinguishable from those of 
Mabley. 
In Mabley, the Island Creek Coal Company leased an entire suite 
in the hotel on an annual basis and provided some of its own furniture 
for the suite.115 While the primary purpose of the suite was for holding 
the daily lunch meetings, the company also held some regular business 
meetings and client dinners in the suite.116 The hotel suite operated as 
a semi-permanent annex of the company’s office space. 
 
 109. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *11 n.12. 
 110. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 338, 359 (1994), aff’d, 65 F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 
1995). 
 111. Mabley v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. 1794, 1794 (1965). 
 112. Id. at 1795. 
 113. Id. at 1797. 
 114. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *8. 
 115. Mabley, 24 T.C.M. at 1795. 
 116. Id. 
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The Mabley court held that because the suite was “acquired and 
actually used for the conduct of business of the company,” it was 
therefore the business premises of the company.117 The company’s 
regular meetings in the leased hotel suite allowed managers and 
executives to discuss the crucial business matters necessary for the 
company to operate.118 
The only support the Mabley court provided for its conclusion 
came at the end of the opinion, where the court stated “under the 
peculiar facts of this case we hold that such suite constituted ‘the 
business premises of the employer.’”119 The brevity of the court’s 
analysis suggests that it believed the suite was obviously the business 
premises of Island Creek Coal Company because of the extent of use, 
the duration of the lease, and other factors explained above. 
Furthermore, by referring to the facts as “peculiar,” the court implies 
that its decision was very dependent on the facts. 
Unlike the company in Mabley, the Bruins entered into separate 
agreements with each away hotel for the short-term rental of a dining 
room, meeting rooms, and catering of meals.120 While the Bruins may 
return to the same hotel for games in the future, the team does not enter 
into a long-term lease of space with any of the hotels like the company 
in Mabley.121 
 Furthermore, the Bruins do not conduct a “significant portion” of 
their business activities at away hotels. In Mabley, the Island Creek 
Coal Company executives and managers essentially operated the 
company from their hotel suite meetings.122 In contrast, especially 
compared to the actual performance of a professional hockey game, 
the Bruins hotel activities fall short of the “quantum and quality” 
degree of significance test from McDonald v. Commissioner.123 
In McDonald, the taxpayer was provided with housing 
accommodations while he worked for the Gulf Oil Company in 
Tokyo, Japan.124 To determine whether the taxpayer’s housing was 
 
 117. Id. at 1797. 
 118. Id. at 1796–97. 
 119. Id. at 1797. 
 120. Jacobs, 2017 WL 2733795 at *2–3. 
 121. Id. at *2. 
 122. Id. at *8. 
 123. 66 T.C. 223 (1976); Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioners at 16, 22, Jacobs v. Comm’r, 
148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15) (T.C. 2017). 
 124. McDonald, 66 T.C. at 225. 
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excludable from his income under Internal Revenue Code section 119, 
the court applied the “significant portion of business” test.125 The 
taxpayer conducted some business activities at his employer-provided 
residence, such as entertaining business guests and making business-
related phone calls.126 However, compared to the overall scope of his 
job, the court found that these activities did not “constitute the 
requisite quantum or quality of activities” to qualify as a “significant 
portion” of his business duties.127 
Because of the significant differences in the facts of Mabley and 
Jacobs, the Jacobs court erred in extending Mabley’s fact-specific 
guidance to this case. Furthermore, the Bruins’s business activities 
conducted at the hotel fall short of the “quantum and quality” 
necessary to qualify as a “significant portion of its business.”128 Thus, 
the Jacobs court should not have found that the Bruins satisfied the 
business premises requirement of section 132(e)(2). Moreover, the 
Jacobs court should not have relied on the Mabley opinion at all 
because it is a non-precedential Tax Court Memorandum. 
B.  The Jacobs Court Erred in Relying on a  
Non-Precedential Tax Court Memorandum 
The U.S. Tax Court is comprised of nineteen judges that are 
appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the 
Senate.129 A single chief judge divides associate judges into divisions 
to hear cases.130 After hearing a case, an associate judge drafts a report 
on the case and presents it to the Chief Judge for review.131 The Chief 
Judge then decides whether the case should undergo further review, 
whether to enter the opinion as a Tax Court Decision, or enter the 
opinion as a Tax Court Memorandum.132 
The option to issue a Memorandum opinion was intended to 
“allow Tax Court judges to decide clear-cut cases without worrying 
about the dangers of establishing precedent.”133 These “Memo” 
 
 125. Id. at 230. 
 126. Id. at 231. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 230. 
 129. I.R.C. § 7443 (2012). 
 130. I.R.C. § 7444 (2012). 
 131. Amandeep S. Grewal, The Un-Precedented Tax Court, 101 IOWA L. REV. 2065, 2079 
(2016). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2067. 
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opinions “involve only heavily factual determinations or applications 
of settled law” and are “not regarded as binding precedent” even 
though “parties may cite to them.”134 Because citations to Memo 
opinions are still permissible, courts are often confused as to their 
value in deciding a case.135 However, that does not change the fact that 
Memo opinions are not supposed to have any precedential value.136 
Because Mabley v. Commissioner is a Tax Court Memorandum 
opinion, the Jacobs court acted inconsistent with its own rules by 
using the Memo as precedential guidance for its analysis of the 
Bruins’s business premises. As noted above, the Tax Court rules 
allowed the Bruins to cite to the Memo in their briefs, but the Jacobs 
court went against its own policy by applying the reasoning in Mabley 
to the facts at hand. 
C.  The Jacobs Ruling Went Against Congress’s Intent  
Regarding Section 132(e)(2) 
Section 132 was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984.137 In the thirty-three years that section 132 has been in force, no 
case law has interpreted the meaning of “eating facilities” under 
section 132(e)(2).138 However, in 2011, the IRS Chief Counsel’s office 
issued advice to an airline on the deductibility of flight crew members’ 
in-flight meals that discussed the definition of “eating facility” under 
section 132(e)(2).139 The Chief Counsel explained that Treasury 
Regulations and case law “imply that an ‘eating facility’ means an 
identifiable location that is designated for the preparation and/or 
consumption of meals,” such as a dining room or cafeteria.140 
Accordingly, the IRS advised that an airplane cabin did not constitute 
 
 134. Id. at 2066–67; Dunaway v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 80, 87 (2005). 
 135. Grewal, supra note 131, at 2068. 
 136. Id. at 2067. 
 137. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 4 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.). 
 138. Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioners at 16, 22, Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 
2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15) (T.C. 2017). 
 139. Memorandum from Lynne Camillo, Chief, Employment Tax Branch 2, Division 
Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel, to James L. May, Jr. Senior Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel 
(Aug. 31, 2011) (on file at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1151020.pdf). 
 140. Id. at 6; see Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(1)(ii) (2016) (“each dining room or cafeteria in which 
meals are served is treated as a separate eating facility”); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(b)(ii)(2) (2016) 
(“direct operating costs test may be applied separately for each dining room or cafeteria”); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(ii)(4) (2016) (“Assume that a not-for-profit hospital system maintains cafeterias 
for the use of its employees and volunteers”). 
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an “eating facility” for flight crew under section 132(e)(2).141 
Similarly, the Bruins did not provide their team meals in an 
“eating facility” as intended under section 132(e)(2). When traveling 
for away games, the Bruins rented “banquet or conference rooms” at 
their team hotel to serve meals.142 Furthermore, these rooms did not 
contain any permanent dining fixtures and were temporarily set up to 
accommodate the team’s buffet-style meals.143 The Bruins’s 
repurposed conference rooms certainly do not constitute “dining 
rooms” or “cafeterias” as envisioned by the Treasury Regulations. 
Therefore, the Jacobs court went against Congress’s intended 
definition of “eating facility” by allowing the Bruins’s hotel meal 
deduction under section 132(e)(2). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Tax Court’s ruling in Jacobs v. Commissioner gave 
companies and organizations across the nation the ability to claim a 
deduction for meals never intended to qualify as de minimis fringe 
benefits. Accounting firms and tax pundits foresaw new circumstances 
that could fall under this new interpretation of section 132(e)(2).144 For 
example, law firms, consultants, and other business services providers 
that send deployment-style teams out of town to their clients’ offices 
could claim the same meal deduction as the Bruins for meals at 
hotels.145 Just as the Bruins were fueling for their games and reviewing 
film during team meals, it could be argued that lawyers are fueling for 
their long day at a client site and discussing negotiation strategy. With 
Jacobs standing as precedent, a law firm with traveling teams of 
lawyers may be able to deduct their team’s meals while on the road. If 
this type of deduction would have become widespread, it could have 
 
 141. Memorandum from Lynne Camillo, Chief, Employment Tax Branch 2, Division 
Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel, to James L. May, Jr. Senior Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel 
(Aug. 31, 2011) (on file at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1151020.pdf). 
 142. Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15), at *2 (T.C. 
2017). 
 143. Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioners at 16, 22, Jacobs v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 24 (2017), 
2017 WL 2733795 (No. 19009-15) (T.C. 2017). 
 144. Rick Farley, Tax Court Allows Full Deduction for Certain Meals Provided to Employees 
on Business Travel, INSIGHTS FROM PEOPLE AND ORG., https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-
services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-court-gives-full-deduction-for-certain-travel-meals-for-
employees.pdf; Reilly, supra note 2. 
 145. See Reilly, supra note 2. 
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led to a loss of millions in tax revenue collected from taxpayers.146 
On December 22, 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act into law in an effort to overhaul the American tax 
system.147 Section 13304(b)(1) of the Act struck down the 100% 
deduction for employer-operated eating facilities.148 Under the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, employer operating eating facility expenses are 
limited to a 50% deduction under §274(n) through the year 2025 and 
will not be deductible beyond 2025.149 By passing these limitations on 
the employer operating eating facility deduction, Congress took a 
necessary step to prevent tax revenue loss from the broad Jacobs 
decision from becoming widespread. While the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
was not solely intended to close the deduction loophole opened by 
Jacobs, the Act will stop taxpayers from taking advantage of the 
Jacobs court’s ill-conceived interpretation of what constitutes an 
“eating facility.” 
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 149. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 407 (2017). 
